John D. Griffin and Grace Sager
Published: 2021, Studies in American Political Development
Publication coming soon!
John D. Griffin, Chad Kiewiet de Jonge, and Vania Ximena Velasco-Guachalla
Published: 2020, British Journal of Political Science
Abstract:
This article elaborates relative deprivation theory to a societal level to argue that political unrest is rooted in the polarization of citizens' grievance judgments, rather than the mean level of societal grievance. Using data from twelve cross-national survey projects, it examines the relationship between citizen polarization and political protest in eighty-four democracies and semi-democracies from 1977 to 2010. The study finds that countries with more polarized citizens are more likely to experience nonviolent protest. Protests are most likely in countries where average citizen grievances are low but citizens are polarized, which is consistent with the elaborated theoretical expectations of relative deprivation theory.
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John D. Griffin and Brian Newman
Published: 2019, Presidential Studies Quarterly 49(2): 310-329.
Abstract:
Presidents face incentives to move toward the median voter as elections approach. We explore the racial consequences of these electoral incentives. As presidents move toward the center, they move away from ideologically noncentrist groups like the Congressional Black Caucus (CBC). Comparing the president鈥檚 annual budget proposal to the CBC鈥檚 alternative budget from 1980 to 2012, we test whether Democrats鈥� (Republicans鈥�) budgets are less (more) congruent with the CBC鈥檚 alternative budgets in election years. Typically, Democrats鈥� budgets are much more congruent than Republicans鈥� with the CBC鈥檚 budgets. However, in election years, Democrats鈥� budget proposals tend to move away from the CBC鈥檚 ideal such that Democrats鈥� budgets are no better aligned with the CBC than are Republicans鈥� budgets.
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John D. Griffin, Brian Newman, and David W. Nickerson
Published: 2019, Legislative Studies Quarterly 44(1): 133-162
Abstract:
Theories of democratic politics prize congruence between citizens鈥� preferences and their elected representatives鈥� actions in office. Elections are a critical means for achieving such policy congruence, providing voters the opportunity to chasten representatives who are out of step with constituent preferences and to reward the faithful. Do voters act this way? Recent studies based on observational data find they do, but these data are somewhat limited. We employ a survey experiment to estimate the extent to which information about policy congruence affects voters鈥� evaluations of representatives. We informed some subjects how often their member of Congress鈥檚 voting decisions match their own stated preferences on the same policies. We find that information about congruence enhances accountability by affecting constituent evaluations of representatives and may also affect citizens鈥� propensity to participate in upcoming elections.
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John D. Griffin, Brian Newman, and Patrick Buhr
Published: 2020, Legislative Studies Quarterly 45(1)
Abstract:
Do Americans care how much money congressional candidates earn? We conducted three experiments to examine how candidates' incomes affect voters' perceptions of the candidates' traits and ultimately their vote intention. Subjects evaluated otherwise identical candidates with annual incomes randomly varying between $75,000, $3 million, and a candidate with no income information provided. Results from the three experiments are remarkably similar. Subjects viewed the $3 million earner as significantly more intelligent than the candidate with no income information provided, but this benefit of high income was overshadowed by significant biases against the $3 million candidate. Subjects consistently viewed the $3 million earner as less honest, less caring, and less representative of them than the other candidates. Ultimately, subjects were less likely to say they would vote for the $3 million candidate. These findings demonstrate that the campaign advantages that high鈥恑ncome candidates enjoy are somewhat offset by voters' initial bias against them.
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